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The United States and Israel fundamentally
disagree about the need to establish a Palestinian state living side
by side with Israel. President Obama is committed to a two-state
solution, while Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu is opposed and has
been for many years. To avoid a direct confrontation with Washington,
Netanyahu will probably change his rhetoric and talk favorably about
two states. But that will not affect Israel’s actions. The
never-ending peace process will go on, Israel will continue building
settlements, and the Palestinians will remain locked up in a handful
of impoverished enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza. Anticipating this
outcome, Obama has told Congress to expect a clash with Israel.
This is not a
fight Obama is likely to win, even though the United States is more
powerful than Israel and most Americans favor creating a Palestinian
state and bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close.
Look at the
historical record. Since 1967, every American president has opposed
settlement-building in the Occupied Territories. Yet no president has
been able to put meaningful pressure on Israel to stop building
settlements, much less dismantle them. Perhaps the best evidence of
American impotence is what happened during the Oslo peace process in
the 1990s. Israel confiscated 40,000 acres of Palestinian land,
constructed 250 miles of connector and bypass roads, doubled the
number of settlers, and built 30 new settlements. President Clinton
did hardly anything to halt this expansion.
The main reason
no president has been able to stop Israel from colonizing the Occupied
Territories is the Israel lobby. It is an especially powerful interest
group that has pushed the American government to establish a “special
relationship” with Israel, which is, as Yitzhak Rabin once said,
“beyond compare in modern history.”
The special
relationship means Washington gives Israel consistent, almost
unconditional diplomatic backing and more foreign aid than any other
country. In other words, Israel gets this aid even when it does things
that the United States opposes, like building settlements.
Furthermore, Israel is rarely criticized by American officials and
certainly not by anyone who aspires to high office. Recall what
happened earlier this year to Charles Freeman, who was forced to
withdraw as head of the National Intelligence Council because he had
criticized certain Israeli policies and questioned the merits of the
special relationship.
Many hope that
Obama will be different from his predecessors and stand up to the
lobby. The indications thus far are not encouraging. During the 2008
presidential campaign, Obama responded to charges that he was “soft”
on Israel by pandering to the lobby and publicly praising the special
relationship. He was silent during the recent Gaza War—when Israel was
being criticized around the world for its brutal assault on that
densely populated enclave—and he said nothing when Freeman was forced
to quit his administration. Like his predecessors, Obama appears to be
no match for the lobby.
Israel’s
supporters in the United States often claim that the special
relationship is not due to the lobby’s influence. The American people,
they argue, identify closely with Israel and put significant pressure
on their leaders to support it generously and unconditionally. But
there is abundant evidence showing that this is not true. Recent polls
indicate that over 70 percent of Americans think that the U.S. should
not take sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and only 47
percent of Americans think that Israel’s influence in the world is
“mainly positive.” Moreover, 60 percent of Americans have said that
the United States should withhold aid to Israel if it resists pressure
to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians.
In short, a clear
majority of Americans do not favor the special relationship and would
back Obama if he leaned on Israel to accept a Palestinian state. The
lobby, however, would surely side with Israel and pressure the White
House to back off. Given the lobby’s track record—as well as Obama’s—it
is difficult to imagine him not caving.
Israel’s
supporters defend the special relationship because they believe it is
an unalloyed good for both countries. In essence, they think that the
two countries’ interests are synonymous, and whatever Israel deems
good for Israel is good for the United States. From their perspective,
there is no need for Israel to change its behavior on any major policy
issue, especially on matters relating to the Palestinians.
But they are
wrong. Israel’s interests, like any other country’s interests, are not
always the same as America’s. Thus it makes little sense for
Washington to back Israel no matter what it does because sometimes
there will be circumstances in which the two countries’ interests
clash. For example, it probably made good sense for Israel to acquire
nuclear weapons in the 1960s, since it lives in a dangerous
neighborhood and a nuclear arsenal is the ultimate deterrent. But a
nuclear-armed Israel was not in the American national interest.
Both countries
would be much better off if the Obama administration treated Israel
the way it treats other democracies, such as Britain, France, Germany,
and India. In practice, this would mean backing Israel when its
actions are consistent with American interests. But when they are not,
Washington would distance itself from Jerusalem and use its
considerable leverage to change Israeli behavior.
The United States
is in deep trouble in the Middle East and has a serious terrorism
problem in good part because of its unconditional support for Israel’s
policies in the Occupied Territories. Backing Israel at almost every
turn also makes it harder for Washington to get open support from
moderate Arab states, even when dealing with common threats like Iran.
Israel’s backers
often maintain that American support for Israel had nothing to do with
9/11, but this claim is simply not true. Consider the motivations of
Khalid Sheik Muhammed, whom the 9/11 Commission describes as the
“principle architect of the attacks.” According to the commission,
“KSM’s animus toward the United States stemmed not from his
experiences there as a student, but rather from his violent
disagreement with U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel.” Numerous
independent accounts have also documented that Osama bin Laden has
been deeply concerned about the Palestinian situation since he was
young, and the 9/11 Commission reports that he wanted the attackers to
strike Congress, which he saw as the most important source of support
for Israel in the United States. The commission also tells us that bin
Laden twice wanted to move the date of the attacks forward because of
events involving Israel—even though doing so would have increased the
risk of failure.
In short, there
is little hope of ending America’s terrorism problem and improving its
standing in the Middle East if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not
resolved. That will only happen if there is a two-state solution, and
that will only occur if the United States puts pressure on Israel.
The special
relationship has become a liability for Israel as well. No country has
ever pursued a flawless foreign policy, yet the lobby makes it
impossible for American leaders to criticize Israel when it does
something foolish. Think of the 2006 Lebanon War, when Washington
backed Israel to the hilt while it employed a strategy that was, as
most Israelis now recognize, boneheaded. The United States would have
been a better friend had it pressured Israel to come up with a smarter
response or pressed for a quick ceasefire. But that is not how the
special relationship works. It is hard to see how this situation makes
good sense for Israel.
So how should the
Obama administration react to Netanyahu’s opposition to a Palestinian
state? The key to understanding this vital issue is to consider two
questions. First, what does Israel’s future look like in the absence
of a two-state solution? In other words, where is Israel headed if
Netanyahu gets his way? Second, what are the likely consequences for
America, Israel, and the Palestinians?
Given present
circumstances, there are three possible alternatives if the
Palestinians do not get their own state, all of which involve creating
a “greater Israel”—an Israel that effectively controls the West Bank
and Gaza, or all of what was once called Mandatory Palestine.
In the first
scenario, greater Israel would become a democratic binational state in
which Palestinians and Jews enjoy equal political rights. This
solution has been suggested by a handful of Jews and a growing number
of Palestinians. It means abandoning the original Zionist vision of a
Jewish state, however, since the Palestinians would eventually
outnumber the Jews in greater Israel. Uri Avnery, a prominent Israeli
journalist and peace activist, is surely correct when he says, “There
is no chance at all that the Jewish public will agree, in this
generation or the next, to live as a minority in a state dominated by
an Arab majority.” Israel’s supporters in America would also have
virtually no interest in this outcome.
Second, Israel
could expel most of the Palestinians from greater Israel, thereby
preserving its Jewish character through an overt act of ethnic
cleansing. This seems unlikely, not just because it would be a crime
against humanity, but also because there are about 5.5 million
Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, and
they would put up fierce resistance if Israel tried to expel them from
their homes.
Still, there are
good reasons to worry that Israel might adopt this solution as the
demographic balance shifts and concerns about the survival of the
Jewish state intensifiy. It is apparent from public-opinion surveys
and everyday discourse that many Israelis hold racist views about
Palestinians, and the recent Gaza War made clear that they have few
qualms about killing Palestinian civilians. A century of conflict and
four decades of occupation will do that to a people. Furthermore, a
substantial number of Israeli Jews—40 percent or more—believe that the
Arab citizens of Israel should be “encouraged” to leave by the
government. Indeed, former foreign minister Tzipi Livni recently said
that if there were a two-state solution, she expected Israel’s
Palestinian citizens to leave and settle in the new Palestinian state.
The final and
most likely alternative is some form of apartheid, whereby Israel
increases its control over the Occupied Territories, but allows the
Palestinians limited autonomy in a set of disconnected and
economically crippled enclaves. Israelis and their American supporters
invariably bristle at the comparison to white rule in South Africa,
but that is their future if they create a greater Israel while denying
full political rights to an Arab population that will soon outnumber
the Jewish population in the entirety of the land. Former prime
minister Ehud Olmert said as much when he proclaimed that if “the
two-state solution collapses,” Israel will “face a South-African-style
struggle.” He went so far as to argue, “as soon as that happens, the
state of Israel is finished.” Other Israelis, as well as Jimmy Carter
and Bishop Desmond Tutu, have warned that continuing the occupation
will turn Israel into an apartheid state.
These three
outcomes are the only alternatives to a two-state solution, and each
would be disastrous for the Jewish state. Apartheid is not a viable
long-term solution because the Palestinians will continue to resist
until they achieve independence. Their resistance will force Israel to
escalate the same repressive policies that have already cost
significant blood and treasure, encouraged political corruption, and
badly tarnished the nation’s global image. More importantly, there
would be little support and much opposition to an apartheid state in
the West, especially in the United States, where democracy is
venerated and segregation is condemned. This is why Olmert said that
going down the apartheid road would be suicidal for Israel.
But bringing
democracy to greater Israel would also mean the end of the Jewish
state because the more numerous Palestinians would dominate its
politics. That leaves ethnic cleansing, which would certainly keep
Israel Jewish. That murderous strategy, however, would do enormous
damage to Israel’s moral fabric, its relationship with Jews in the
diaspora, and its international standing. Israel and its supporters
would be treated harshly by history. No genuine friend of Israel could
support such a heinous course of action.
Given this grim
situation, it is not surprising that a significant number of Israelis
have moved abroad and many others would leave if they could. There are
somewhere between 700,000 and 1 million Israeli Jews living outside
the country, many of whom are unlikely to return. Since 2007,
emigration has been outpacing immigration in Israel. According to
scholars John Mueller and Ian Lustick, “a recent survey indicates that
only 69 percent of Jewish Israelis say they want to stay in the
country, and a 2007 poll finds that one-quarter of Israelis are
considering leaving, including almost half of all young people.” They
report, “in another survey, 44 percent of Israelis say they would be
ready to leave if they could find a better standard of living
elsewhere,” and “over 100,000 Israelis have acquired European
passports.” These figures are a bad omen for Israel.
This discussion
of where Israel is heading raises the obvious question: would it not
be in Israel’s best interests for President Obama to put significant
pressure on both Israel and the Palestinians to agree to a two-state
solution? In fact, would it not have been better for Israel if the
United States had long ago stopped it from building settlements and
instead helped create a Palestinian state? One wonders what future the
opponents of a two-state solution envision for greater Israel, for it
is hard to see a favorable outcome if the Palestinians do not get
their own state. This is not to say that two states living side by
side represents an ideal outcome for either side; it is simply better
than the alternatives.
Finally, denying
the Palestinians their own state is not in the lobby’s interest, and
not just because of the consequences for Israel. Over the past two
decades, the case for backing Israel—no matter what it does—has become
a tough sell in the United States, especially on college campuses.
Younger Jews appear to be more willing to criticize Israel than their
elders. Americans of all persuasions are becoming increasingly aware
of what Israel did to the Palestinians in 1948 and what it has been
doing in the Occupied Territories since 1967. Consequently, Israel no
longer looks like the victim; it looks like the victimizer, and a
ruthless one at that. This situation is sure to get worse if Israel
turns itself into an apartheid state in full view of the world.
Because Israel’s
treatment of the Palestinians will be increasingly hard to defend, the
lobby will have to rely more than ever on threats and intimidation.
Facts and reason are not effective weapons when trying to justify an
apartheid state. Given the growing awareness of the lobby’s
activities—thanks mainly to the Internet—its actions are already being
scrutinized in ways they were not in the past. In other words, it has
become difficult for the lobby to wield its influence without leaving
fingerprints, and greater recognition of its role is likely to trigger
greater resentment. Its torpedoing of the Freeman appointment, which
was widely discussed in the blogosphere and eventually by the
mainstream media, is a case in point. The lobby’s behavior will become
more heavy-handed and transparent, which runs the risk of angering
large numbers of Americans, including many Jews. It would be much
easier for the lobby to defend Israel if it lived alongside a
Palestinian state.
President Obama
would like to change the situation because he understands that a
two-state solution would be good for America, good for Israel, and
good for the Palestinians. But Netanyahu seems determined to thwart
his efforts. Who is likely to win this fight?
As things stand,
Obama has little chance of prevailing, mainly because the lobby’s key
institutions will side with Israel, and the American president shows
little sign of being willing to take on the lobby. Other factors also
weigh against him. There are about 480,000 settlers and a huge
infrastructure of roads and settlements in the West Bank. Given that
the political center of gravity in Israel has shifted sharply to the
right over time, it is hard to imagine any Israeli government having
the political will, much less the ability, to dismantle a substantial
portion of that enormous enterprise. Consider that a February 2009
poll found that 59 percent of Israelis opposed a Palestinian state;
only 32 percent supported it.
Nor is there much
sympathy for the two-state solution in the American Jewish community.
A 2007 survey found that only 46 percent of Jews in this county
favored the establishment of a Palestinian state, probably because 82
percent of those surveyed believed that “the goal of the Arabs is not
the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of
Israel.” A 2008 J Street poll showed more support for the two-state
solution (78 percent) but also revealed substantial opposition to
dismantling Israeli settlements and making East Jerusalem part of
Palestine. Those reservations, coupled with deep-seated fears of
Palestinian motives, will help the lobby’s hardliners make their case.
Of course, Christian Zionists will adamantly oppose the two-state
solution: they want Israel to control every square millimeter of
Palestine because they believe that will facilitate Christ’s Second
Coming.
Obama’s only
hope—and it is a slim one—is that a substantial part of the American
Jewish community will come to understand Olmert’s warning that Israel
will become like white-ruled South Africa if there is no two-state
solution. More American Jews need to understand that Israel is in
serious peril and that the situation is likely to get worse, not
better. Obama would be acting as Israel’s friend if he put pressure on
both sides to reach a settlement. If there is no agreement, Israel
faces a grim future, and it will become very difficult to defend
Israel. In short, more Jewish-Americans need to recognize that it is
in their interest to champion the two-state solution.
If that does not
happen, Obama will be unable to get tough with Israel. There will be
even more trouble ahead for Israel, the United States, and especially
the Palestinians. |
